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For nearly two decades banks in the United States have consolidated in record numbers&in terms
of both frequency and the size of the merging institutions.  Rhoades (1996) hypothesizes that the main
motivators were increased potential for geographic expansion created by changes in state laws regulating
branching and a more favorable antitrust climate. 
To  look for evidence of  economic incentives to exploit these improved opportunities for
consolidation, we examine how consolidation affects expected profit, the riskiness of profit, profit
efficiency, market value, market-value efficiencies, and the risk of insolvency.  Our estimates of
expected profit, profit risk, and profit efficiency are based on a structural model of leveraged portfolio
production that was estimated for a sample of highest-level U.S. bank holding companies in Hughes,
Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996).  Here, we also estimate two additional measures that gauge efficiency
in terms of the market values of assets and of equity.
Our findings suggest that the economic benefits of consolidation are strongest for those banks
engaged in interstate expansion and, in particular, interstate expansion that diversifies banks’
macroeconomic risk.  Not only do these banks experience clear gains in their financial performance, but
society also benefits from the enhanced bank safety that follows from this type of consolidation.
JEL Codes: G2, D2, G21, G28
Key Words: bank, consolidation, mergers, diversification, efficiency1Williamson (1967) and McAfee and McMillan (1995) model these agency costs and, therefore,
the degree of inefficiency, as an increasing function of the length of a firm’s managerial hierarchy. 
Mester (1991) finds empirical evidence of such agency costs in the S&L industry.
THE DOLLARS AND SENSE OF BANK CONSOLIDATION
1.  Introduction
For nearly two decades banks in the United States have consolidated in record numbers&in terms
of both frequency and the size of the merging institutions.  From 1980 to 1994, there was an average of
423 mergers per year&a total of 6,347 mergers, which amounted to 43 percent of all banks in existence
in 1980 (Rhoades, 1996).  Some of the largest mergers in banking history took place during this period. 
Prior to 1980 almost no mergers occurred where the acquired bank as well as the acquiring  bank had
assets in excess of $1 billion; however, during the period 1980-1994, 142 mergers involved pairs of large
banks (Rhoades, 1996).   Because state laws restricting interstate banking were relaxed during this
period, 56 percent of the 142 large-bank mergers were interstate transactions.
Rhoades hypothesizes that changes in state laws regulating branching and a more favorable
antitrust climate were the main factors behind the wave of bank mergers, especially interstate mergers. 
He also argues that as the trend toward interstate consolidation became clear, many banks formulated
intrastate merger policies that would make them large enough to compete with potential out-of-state
entrants as well as with other in-state banks.  Since most state laws allowed out-of-state entry only by
merger with or acquisition of an existing bank, banks’ merger policies also sought to make the banks
either more valuable takeover targets or too large to tackle.
Increased opportunities for expansion alone are not sufficient motivation for bank consolidation. 
While expansion may provide benefits of better diversification of assets and liabilities, spreading of
overhead costs, and a wider scope of products and services, it may also increase the complexity of
organization, which can raise costs of production and lead to greater inefficiency due to hard-to-control
agency problems between managers and owners of the firm.
1  This paper examines whether there is
evidence of net economic benefits from exploiting the improved opportunities for consolidation.  We
empirically test whether consolidation benefits banks by enhancing profit, efficiency, and market value,2
and further, whether it improves bank safety in terms of the probability of remaining solvent.  To address
these issues, we synthesize the market-value approach and the production-based approach to examining
the effect of consolidation on banks’ economic performance.  This synthesis allows us to account for the
effect of consolidation on banks’ expected current profitability and ex ante profit risk as well as on the
market value of the banking firm.
Our production-based measures of performance&expected profit, profit risk, profit inefficiency,
and insolvency risk&are based on a structural model of leveraged portfolio production, which was
estimated using 1994 data on a sample of 441 highest level U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) in
Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996). In our synthesis of this approach with the market-value
approach, we demonstrate that the capital markets price our measures of expected profit and profit risk,
since these estimated variables explain nearly all of the variation in the market value of equity.  Using a
model developed by Hughes, Lang, Moon, and Pagano (1998), we then estimate two additional measures
that gauge efficiency in terms of the market value of assets and the market value of equity.  Our market-
value measures of efficiency can be derived only for the subsample of 190 publicly traded BHCs, while
the production-based measures can be used to consider consolidation’s effects on privately as well as
publicly held banks.  However, since inefficiency measured by the production-based technique is priced
by capital markets, we can infer from our production-based results how the market values of privately
held banks are influenced by consolidation.
  Rather than examine the details of merger events and analyze banks’ performance before and
after particular mergers, we propose an alternative approach.  Our approach identifies banks that have
been active in consolidating by their structural characteristics that are correlated with all their past
mergers and considers how the structural characteristics of different merger strategies affect
performance.  For example, a BHC that has made numerous interstate acquisitions may operate 1400
branches in 12 states. We show that a bank’s consolidation activities are highly correlated with its asset
size, the number of branches it operates, the number of states in which these branches are located, and3
the dispersion of the bank’s deposits across these states.  We also find a somewhat smaller correlation
between these measures of consolidation activities and the degree to which the bank’s macroeconomic
risk is diversified.  Using these structural correlates as proxies for BHCs’ consolidation activities, we ask
how they are related to both production-based and market-value measures of performance. 
We simulate the effects of different consolidation strategies on our performance measures by
proportionately varying different subsets of the structural characteristics.  For example, a consolidation
strategy that involves within-state expansion is simulated by allowing asset size and number of branches
to increase proportionately while holding constant the indices of across-state deposit dispersion and
macroeconomic diversity.  In contrast, an interstate expansion is simulated by proportionately increasing
not only asset size and branches, but also the number of states in which the bank operates and the index
of deposit dispersion.  To simulate an interstate expansion into economically similar neighboring states,
we hold the index of macroeconomic diversity constant, while to simulate an interstate expansion that
improves geographic diversity, we also proportionately increase the index of macroeconomic diversity. 
Note that our approach allows us to simulate different consolidation strategies without having to account
for the complications of specific merger events.
We find strong evidence that interstate consolidation strategies, particularly ones that increase
the degree of macroeconomic diversification, improve market-value efficiency and production efficiency
and reduce BHCs’ insolvency risk.  However, consolidation strategies that do not enhance geographic
diversity lower insolvency risk but fail to affect efficiency.  We investigate whether our results are
similar for BHCs that have recently acquired assets and those that have not.  In most cases, we could not
find significant differences for these two groups.  We did, however, find that while geographic
diversification is related to lower insolvency risk for all BHCs, the effect is smaller for banks that have
recently engaged in acquisitions.  This might suggest that the full benefits of diversification in terms of
lower insolvency risk are seen only several years after acquisitions occur, or that there are diminishing
returns to geographic diversification, since acquirers, as a group, have higher average levels of4
geographic diversification than nonacquirers over this period. 
In summary, our findings provide evidence to support Rhoades’ hypothesis that consolidation
offers its most significant gains in financial performance to BHCs whose consolidation strategy involves
interstate expansion, particularly interstate branching that diversifies macroeconomic risk.  Not only do
these BHCs experience clear gains in their financial performance, but society also benefits from the
enhanced BHC safety that follows from this type of consolidation. 
2.  Assessing the Economic Incentives to Consolidate 
Making sense of the merger wave must ultimately translate into dollars and cents.  However,
who benefits from these transactions is an unsettled matter.   Acquiring banks claim to benefit by
increasing their profitability and shareholder value.  Among their rationales for merging are scale
economies that follow from consolidating adminstrative and back-office operations and from
consolidating branches when the merging banks’ branching networks overlap.  Scale economies can also
result from diversification of assets and liabilities that reduces the costs of risk management.  Moreover,
given the current emphasis on relationship banking, many merger partners cite scope economies they
expect to achieve by combining their different product lines in a single institution.  With a broader array
of financial products, the consolidated bank expects to increase the potential revenues that can be
obtained from any particular relationship and to reduce the average costs of marketing these products.  
Nevertheless, while expansion may provide many, if not all, of these benefits, it may also increase the
complexity of the organization, which can raise the costs of production and the costs of controlling
agency problems.  On balance, the existence of consolidation benefits is an empirical issue.
Indeed, the academic literature frequently questions the existence of such gains and often
attributes the incentive to consolidate to agency problems and managerial self-aggrandizement that
compromise efficiency and destroy shareholder value.  Although some studies have found benefits in
consolidation both for acquirers and for the acquired, most studies either obtain inconclusive results or5
find that acquirers generally suffer a loss of market value.  Moreover, the academic evidence for the cost
economies often claimed by merging banks is no more conclusive.  Pilloff and Santomero (1996) and
Calomiris and Karceski (1998) provide a critical review of this literature.  
Whether studies measure the benefits of consolidation in terms of cost economies and profit
efficiency or in terms of the market’s assessment of these gains, they generally focus on the merger event
itself.  These studies attempt to capture the financial performance of the merging institutions before and
after the merger to determine who benefits from the transaction.  But, as Pilloff and Santomero (1996)
and Calomiris and Karceski (1998) point out, the merger event is a complicated transaction that can
easily confound analytical attempts to investigate it.  Studies that focus on the merger event must define
a before-and-after time period to compare either stock-price reactions or other measures of financial
performance.  However, as the period is widened&to capture the leakage of information prior to the
event in the case of event studies and to allow for enough time after the merger that its benefits can be
realized in the case of other measures of performance&it becomes more difficult to distinguish the
merger’s effect on performance from other influences.  In addition, some studies try to isolate the effects
of mergers by considering banks that have engaged only in a single merger in the before-and-after time
period.  But evidence from such studies may not be applicable to the large number of banks engaged in
multiple mergers.
For studies that use the reaction of stock prices to the announcement of the merger event to
assess its before-and-after effects on financial performance, expectations and informational asymmetries
can generate misleading results.  Calomiris and Karceski (1998) contend that a negative market reaction
to the announcement of a particular merger may not imply that the merger is unprofitable but, rather, that
the market had already capitalized an alternative, more valuable merger strategy that it expected and is
now adjusting to a less valuable strategy.  Drawing on a study by Pilloff (1996) that finds that post-
merger financial performance seems unrelated to the stock-price reaction to the merger announcement,
Pilloff and Santomero (1996) suggest that markets may have a difficult time gauging how successfully6
2DeYoung (1997) finds that the efficiency gains of bank mergers are concentrated among banks
that have made frequent acquisitions.
3Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995) consider bank mergers during the period 1981-86 and find
evidence that acquiring banks sought to diversify earnings "in an effort to generate higher levels of cash
flow for the same levels of risk" (p. 778).
the merged banks will be integrated.  A merger may promise benefits that are not realized because the
integration process is itself inefficient.
2
To overcome these problems, which arise from focusing on merger events, we use an alternative
approach that considers, instead, the structural characteristics that summarize the histories of BHCs’
mergers and that characterize their merger strategies.  By focusing on the effects of structural
characteristics on BHCs’ financial  performance, we are able to simulate different consolidation
strategies without having to account for the complications of specific merger events.  We do not have to
define a before-and-after time period, since we estimate the effects of the structural variables in a cross
section.  By including all the BHCs in the cross section, we can avoid the selection bias that results from
selecting just the BHCs that engage in a single merger in the relevant time period.  To gauge how capital
markets respond to consolidation, we ask not how it reacts to the announcement of a merger, but how
different consolidation strategies characterized by our structure correlates affect BHCs’ market value.
Just as the previous merger studies have failed to uncover strong evidence on the benefits of
consolidation, perhaps the most puzzling and often-cited result in the literature is the absence of scale
economies.  Like the negative findings of the merger studies, this result contradicts the testimony of
merger participants, who usually list scale economies among their motives for merging.  Again,
methodological issues might be at the crux of the puzzle.  Several recent studies have suggested that the
key to uncovering these elusive scale economies is to account for how banks’ risk-taking endogenously
responds to an increased scale of operations (Hughes and Mester, 1998; Hughes, Lang, Mester, and
Moon, 1995, 1996).  In banking, greater size implies the potential for improved diversification at any
given expected return.  That is, enhanced diversification improves the risk-return tradeoff for the
institutions.
3  In turn, better diversification reduces the marginal and average costs of risk management7
(e.g.,  the same degree of protection against financial distress can be attained at a lower capital-to-asset
ratio).  This lower cost of risk management contributes to the potential for scale economies.  But the
overall level of risk is an endogenous choice of the bank, and the lower cost of risk management due to
better diversification may encourage a bank to take on more risk since it now receives greater marginal
benefits in the form of higher expected returns.  If larger banks tend to take on more risk and if this
additional risk-taking is costly, failing to account for the cost-increasing effect of additional risk-taking
can mask potential scale economies that result from better diversification.  
Scale economies should measure the effect on cost of a proportional variation in outputs, holding
endogenous risk constant, but the standard studies of scale economies ignore risk and, thus, measure the
effect on cost of both increasing output and increasing endogenous risk.  Hence, they are less likely to
detect the cost-savings of better diversification.  Hughes and Mester (1998) and Hughes, Lang, Mester,
and Moon (1995, 1996) control for endogenous risk-taking by accounting for the endogeneity of banks’
equity capital demand and its influence on banks’ risk-taking, and they find evidence of large scale
economies that increase with asset size, a result that suggests that the largest banks have not yet been
observed.  These studies attribute the unexploited scale economies to the once pervasive restrictions on
intrastate and interstate branching in the U.S.  As states have relaxed these restrictions, they have created
the opportunity for banks to exploit these previously unattainable scale economies by consolidating their 
branching networks.
Several studies have confirmed that greater diversification leads to higher profits and higher
endogenous risk-taking.  These studies use either a market-value approach or a production model
approach to measure bank performance.  Using stock market returns and the event-study method, Chong
(1991) finds that interstate consolidation increases profitability and risk.  Chong concludes that while
geographic expansion reduces the risk of a given portfolio, it also expands banks’ opportunities to take
risks.  A similar conclusion is reached by Demsetz and Strahan (1995), who examine stock market data
and find that improved diversification reduces risk only when they control for banks’ portfolio8
4Blair and Heggestad (1978) and Koehn and Santomero (1980) have made similar points
regarding the effects of more stringent regulation on banks’ choice of risk.
composition and activities.  When they allow banks to adjust their portfolios and activities to respond to
improved diversification, risk is no longer reduced.
Estimating a structural model of production that allows for risk-return tradeoffs, Hughes, Lang,
Mester and Moon (1996) (hereafter, HLMM) estimate efficiency relative to an estimated risk-return
frontier.  Consistent with the market-value-based estimates cited above, they find that geographically
diversified BHCs have higher expected returns and higher return risk.  Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey
(1997) estimate efficiency using a production model to demonstrate that large bank mergers significantly
improve profit efficiency and hypothesize that this improvement results from increases in loan-to-asset
ratios and increases in  leverage.  They conclude that the larger scale of these merged banks and their
greater geographic diversity allow them to increase their loan-to-asset ratios and their leverage without
increasing risk.
Whether, in fact, better diversification leads to greater risk-taking depends on several factors. 
Value-maximizing banks must balance the higher expected profit of riskier investment strategies and the
higher option value of mispriced deposit insurance against the effect of additional risk on both the
discount rate applied to profit and to the potential for costly episodes of financial distress.  Financial
distress costs derive from the potential for liquidity crises, regulatory intervention in a bank’s operations,
and even loss of a bank’s valuable charter.  Thus, although diversification improves banks’ risk-return
tradeoffs, it does not necessarily imply that value-maximizing banks will choose less risky investment
strategies.
4  Nor, does it necessary imply that banks will choose investment strategies that reduce their
likelihood of insolvency.  On the one hand, if consolidation’s promised scale and scope economies
increase profitability at any given level of risk, it reduces the probability of insolvency at any given level
of risk.  On the other hand, if consolidation leads banks to adopt higher risk investment strategies, it
could increase the risk of insolvency.9
5Firms might trade profitability for reduced risk for reasons in addition to distress costs.  See
Smith and Stulz (1985) and Tufano (1996).
To investigate the economic incentives to consolidate and to consider consolidation’s effect on
bank safety, i.e., the probability of insolvency, we synthesize the production-based and market-value
approaches, which allows us to consolidate their respective advantages.  In particular, production-based
approaches rely on accounting data and typically estimate a frontier profit or cost function from which
efficiency and scale economies can be gauged.  Since market data are available only for publicly traded
banks, studies using accounting data include a much broader sample of banks.  In addition, because
frontier methods measure banks’ inefficiency, they can consider the incentives to consolidate that are
created by efficiency differences among banks, and they can examine the effects of consolidation on
profit and cost efficiency.  However, frontier methods based on standard profit and cost functions
typically fail to account adequately for banks’ risk.
The efficiency measure based on the standard profit  frontier would count as equally efficient
two banks that have the same predicted profit and are otherwise identical except that one is riskier than
the other.  When the risk difference is priced by capital markets, the bank that does not manage risk as
well will suffer a lower market value.   Substituting historical measures of risk into standard profit 
functions does not remedy this problem.  In particular, the logical apparatus of the standard  profit and
cost functions cannot generate a measure of the ex ante riskiness of the production plans that banks
choose.   These functions are based on the assumption that banks maximize profit without regard to risk. 
However, if banks maximize value rather than profit and if banks’ riskiness affects their discount rate on
their expected profits, production-based efficiency measurement must account for ex ante risk as well as
profitability to capture the market’s evaluation of banks’ performance. Moreover, if  there is the potential
for costly episodes of financial distress, trading current  profitability for reduced risk, not maximizing
current profit, is a value-maximizing strategy.
5    Although profit and cost functions based on profit
maximization aim to gauge the effects of consolidation on cost and profitability, they are logically10
6We report White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and use these in all tests (White,
1980).  Note that in our regressions, the dependent variables are based on estimates.  As Saxonhouse
(1976) shows, when the dependent variable is estimated, this can introduce heteroscedasticity into the
regression.  His method for treating heteroscedasticity that can arise when estimated parameters are used
as dependent variables is not applicable here, since our dependent variables are nonlinear (i.e.,
logarithmic) transformations of estimates for which we can compute estimated values of their standard
errors but not exact values.  Instead, we handle the potential heteroscedasticity problem by computing
White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of our regression coefficients.
7Most of our geographic diversification and consolidation variables are entered into the
regression equation in logarithmic form, so that the coefficient on such a variable is an elasticity.  The
unable to account for its effects on endogenous risk taking and how the expected profitability and risk of
banks’ production plans influence their market value.
An important advantage of the market-value approach is that the final arbiter of how to evaluate
profitability and risk is, of course, the market’s valuation.  While studies of bank consolidation based on
market-value approaches implicitly account for risk and its endogeneity, they do not measure banks’
efficiency and consolidation’s effect on it.  This suggests the advantages of combining these two
approaches.  In our synthesis we show that our production-based measures of expected profit and profit
risk explain market value and, hence, that our measure of profit efficiency that controls for ex ante risk is
priced by capital markets.  Our market-value efficiency measures also confirm this relationship.
Rather than focus on the before-and-after effects of a merger, our empirical strategy is to
characterize different merger strategies by their effects on BHC structure and geographic diversity.  First,
we examine the effects of variables indicating structure and geographic diversification on BHC
performance by regressing production-based and market-value-based performance measures on these
variables.  Thus, we use OLS to estimate the following equation for each performance measure:
(1) ln (Performance)i ' *0 % *
)xi % ,i ,
where xi represents a vector of measures of BHC structure and geographic diversification (and other
control variables).
6   Then, by analogy to scale economies, which measure how a proportionate increase
in output changes costs, we estimate the effects on performance of proportional variations in different
groups of the BHC structure variables that characterize different consolidation strategies.
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effect of a proportionate increase in a group of these x variables is just the sum of the coefficients on
these variables.
3. Production-Based Performance Measures: Expected Profit, Profit Risk,
Profit Inefficiency, and Insolvency Risk
Banks use labor, physical capital, and various funding sources, including equity (financial)
capital, to produce investments in financial outputs, principally loans and securities.  This production
plan is characterized not only by the quantity of inputs and outputs but also by their quality (riskiness). 
A bank’s choice of production plan reflects, in part, its managers’ beliefs about how stochastic market
conditions interact with the ex ante production plan to imply a conditional, subjective probability
distribution for realized profit.  However, the choice of production plan also reflects managers’
preferences.
Different production plans imply different probability distributions for profit.  Management’s
ranking of production plans can be interpreted as a preference ordering of conditional subjective
probability distributions of profit (Hughes and Moon, 1997).  If managers maximize profit, they rank
plans only by the first moment of the distribution.  However, if they maximize value, higher moments of
the distribution will matter in the ranking because risk influences the discount rate on profit.
Managers who act in the interests of shareholders choose the production plan that maximizes the
value of the bank’s equity.  If there are no agency problems that lead to risk shifting and the
expropriation of value from debtholders, maximizing the value of equity is equivalent to maximizing the
sum of the market values of debt and equity&i.e., the market value of assets.  The market value of equity
is the present value, V0, of the net cash flows,





where 2 is the required return on equity and CF is expected net cash flow.  The expected net cash flow
that follows from any particular production plan consists of two components: expected profit and
expected costs of financial distress.  Financial distress costs are costs associated with liquidity crises,12
8The inverse z-score is defined as the standard deviation of return on equity/(1+expected return
on equity).  There is a difference between the insolvency risk of a BHC and that of the individual
subsidiaries.  However, several factors tie the two together.  The "cross guarantee" provisions of
FIRREA (1989) make commonly controlled depository institutions liable for any losses.  In addition,
BHCs can borrow to supply capital to their bank subsidiaries.
regulatory intervention and, in extreme cases, the costs associated with insolvency and the loss of the
valuable charter.
When episodes of financial distress are costly to the bank, managers maximize the value of the
bank’s equity and, in the absence of agency problems, the value of the bank’s assets by choosing a
production plan that trades expected profit for a reduced expected cost of financial distress.  Moreover,
the required return on the bank’s equity depends on the bank’s exposure to systematic risk, which
depends, in turn, on the bank’s choice of production plan.  From (2) it is clear that value-maximizing
banks must balance a production plan’s expected profitability not only against its expected distress costs,
but also against its effect on the bank’s exposure to systematic risk and on the resulting discount rate on
cash flows.
The market’s evaluation of (2) is readily observable for BHCs that are publicly traded. 
However,  the components of (2) must be inferred from production data.  The standard profit function is
not suitable for this task, since it neither incorporates risk nor does it allow for any production plan other
than the profit-maximizing one.  Maximizing value requires that production plans be assessed not just for
their contribution to expected profit but also for their contribution to market-priced risk and to expected
distress costs.  A plan that increases expected profit but also raises the discount rate can reduce the
present value of the expected profit.  Thus, a production-based model of bank performance must be able
to estimate both return and risk.
The production-based performance measures we use here include estimates of expected profits,
profit risk, profit inefficiency, and bank insolvency risk measured by the inverse z-score.
8  These
estimates are derived from HLMM (1996).  Based on the logic of managerial utility maximization, their
model of production allows managers to rank production plans by higher moments of their implied13
probability distributions of profit and, hence, accommodates value maximization as well as profit
maximization and the case where the potential for costly episodes of financial distress makes trading
profit for reduced risk a value-maximizing strategy.
The HLMM production system uses the Almost Ideal Demand System to obtain the functional
forms for the profit share equation, input share equations, and a first-order condition defining the optimal
demand for financial capital.  Just as estimating this demand system using consumption data allows one
to recover consumers’ preferences for goods and services, estimating it with production data allows one
to recover managers’ preferences for production plans and their implied probability distributions of
profit.  HLMM specified five outputs: liquid assets, short-term securities, long-term securities, loans and
leases net of unearned income, and other assets; both the output levels and prices appear in the profit and
input share equations.  Six inputs were specified: financial (equity) capital, labor, physical capital,
insured deposits, uninsured deposits, and other borrowed money; the level of financial capital, and prices
of the other inputs appear in the model.  As indicators of a BHC’s output quality, the model included the
amount of nonperforming assets and a risk premium measured by the average contractual return on
assets relative to the risk-free return.  Since managers are permitted to rank production plans by higher
moments of their implied probability distribution of profit, certain variables that would be excluded by
the logic of profit maximization are also included&in particular, the federal plus state tax rates and
noninterest income.  (When the restrictions implied by assuming that firms maximize profits are imposed
on the Almost Ideal Demand System, its functional form becomes identical to the standard translog
profit system.)
Nonlinear two-stage least squares was used to estimate the system of equations comprising the
profit share equation, the input share equations, and the first-order condition for equity capital.  Adding-
up conditions and certain symmetry conditions were imposed.  The data were obtained from the balance
sheets and income statements of U.S. BHCs as reported on the FRY-9 Financial Statements for the four
quarters of 1994.  Excluded were BHCs located in unit banking states, BHCs that consisted primarily of14
9See HLMM for a more complete discussion of this methodology.
nonbank banks, and special purpose banks.  De novos, defined as BHCs that were not operating as of
June 1986, were also excluded.  The final sample included 441 highest-level BHCs, ranging in size from
$32.5 million to $249.7 billion in consolidated assets.  Interested readers may refer to HLMM for a full
description of the model, variable definitions, and estimation method.
The estimates of expected profit, the risk of profit, profit inefficiency, and insolvency risk for
each BHC are based on the estimated production model.  Expected profit is measured as the predicted
profit from the estimated profit share equation.  Profit risk is measured by the standard error of predicted
profit.  Hence, both expected profit and profit risk depend on the BHC’s production decisions and its
economic environment, which are variables in the production model.  Insolvency risk can then be
measured as profit risk/(financial capital + expected profit).  Profit inefficiency can be derived from
estimates in HLMM of a best-practice risk-return frontier.  Expected return was measured as expected
profit divided by equity capital and return risk was measured by profit risk divided by equity capital. 
Then the best-practice risk-return frontier was computed by using stochastic frontier estimation
techniques.  Expected return divided by its standard deviation, ERN, was specified as a quadratic function
of return risk divided by its standard deviation, RKN:
(3) ER
)







A composite error term, ,i = <i ! ui, is used to distinguish inefficiency from statistical noise.  The
two-sided component, <i, is distributed N(0,F
2
<) and accounts for any unmeasured randomness in the
data-generation process of risk and return.  The one-sided component, ui > 0, is distributed half normally,
i.e., it is the absolute value of a variable distributed N(0,F
2
u), and gauges inefficiency, the failure to
achieve the frontier return at a given level of risk.  Maximum likelihood estimation was used, and return
inefficiency was measured by the conditional expectation of ui given ,i.
9  As shown in HLMM, this
frontier is positively sloped, indicating that higher expected return is accompanied by higher return risk. 
(In contrast, studies that use historical measures of  risk and return often find that higher risk is15
accompanied by lower realized return.)
Here, rather than use return inefficiency, we define profit inefficiency as return inefficiency
multiplied by the BHC’s financial (equity) capital.  It can be interpreted as a shortfall in a BHC’s
expected profit relative to the best-practice profit, for a given level of risk.
Profit inefficiency derived from the managerial utility-maximizing model of HLMM differs from
that derived from the standard frontier profit function in at least two important ways.  First, it controls for
risk.  Two BHCs that are equally profitable and otherwise identical except that one does not control risk
as well would be judged equally efficient by the standard model but not by the HLMM model.  
Second, the standard analysis fits the best-practice frontier using the profit function.  Hence, its
efficiency measure controls for the arguments in the profit function.   When some of these arguments are,
in fact, endogenous, measured inefficiency will be understated because it has not accounted for the effect
on profitability of  poor choices of these arguments.  For example, output prices are a standard argument
in the profit function.  In the case of banking, output prices often represent interest rates earned on assets,
and these interest rates reflect the contractual rates set by banks and the resulting risk banks have chosen
to take.  Banks that set higher rates expect higher profit and higher risk, but higher rates do not
necessarily yield higher return.  When the standard analysis controls for these prices in measuring
efficiency, it does not capture any inefficiency due to a poor choice of contractual rates.  The profit
inefficiency measure based on our production model does capture this type of effect because we fit the
best-practice return frontier not to the arguments of the model’s profit function, but to the return and risk
derived from the profit function. While our model’s profit function and its prediction depend on these
prices, the best-practice return at any given level of risk does not&i.e., it is simply the highest, noise-
adjusted return observed for any choice of prices at the given level of risk.  Hence, our production-based
efficiency measure derived from this frontier accounts for the optimality of these prices and similar16
10See Hughes (1998) for a more detailed discussion of these issues.  To the extent that banks
exercise market power, the loan rates and deposit rates they set may reflect not just risk, but also their
market power.  Hence, our efficiency measure captures market advantage as well as inherent managerial
efficiency.  Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey (1997) do not find statistically significant evidence that
large-bank mergers have affected these prices.  Using event-study methods, Siems (1996) examined
large-bank mergers in 1995 and rejected the market-power hypothesis as a motive for mergers.
arguments in the profit function.
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One drawback of our profit inefficiency measure is that it measures each BHC’s inefficiency at
its observed level of risk.  Our inefficiency measure would fail to pick up the extent to which a BHC is
operating at a level of risk that was not optimal, since our production model is unable to generate a
market price of risk.  Capital markets are, of course, the ultimate arbiters of the optimality of a BHC’s
risk.  Thus, we use two additional measures of efficiency that are based on the market values of BHCs’
assets and equity, which we describe in the next section.
4. Market-Value Performance Measures: Market-Value of Equity, Market
Value of Assets, and Market-Value Inefficiency
In addition to the production-based measures of performance, we also use measures based on
market values at the end of 1994.  The market-value data were obtained from the stock-price database of
the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) and from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database
and  were available for the subsample of 190 of our 441 BHCs that were publicly traded.  Our measures
include the market value of equity, the market value of assets, and market-value equity inefficiency, and
market-value asset inefficiency, which are described below.  We investigate how closely these market-
value measures of performance are related to our production-based measures for the 190 BHCs for which
we have both.  A close relationship would give us confidence in our production-based measures for the
privately held BHCs for which market values are not available.
As discussed in the previous section, the required return on the BHC’s equity, 2, depends on the
BHC’s exposure to systematic risk, and this exposure depends on the BHC’s choice of production plan. 
Our production model’s estimate of expected current profit and profit risk are, in principle, components17
11The market value of assets is the sum of the discounted cash flows to debt and equity, but the
production model does not give us an expected cash flow on debt.  Thus, we cannot use the system in (4)
to estimate the effects of consolidation on the market value of assets.
of equation (2), since expected profit influences expected cash flows in period 1 and profit risk
influences period 1’s required rate of return, 21.  If the production model’s proxy for risk is closely
related to the required return on equity in current and in future periods, 2t, and if its measure of expected
profit based on the estimated profit share equation accurately gauges expected current profit and proxies
well for future, unobserved profit (at t = 2, ... , 4), then the production model should be able to explain
the part of market value that excludes expected distress costs.  (If the production plan is a good proxy for
expected distress costs, the production model may well explain the second component of market value.) 
To determine how well our measures of expected profit and risk explain variations in the market value
of equity and to explore the effects of BHC structure and geographic diversification (characterized by a
vector of variables, x), on the market value of equity, instead of estimating equation (1) with the market
value of equity as a performance measure, we use the Generalized Method of Moments technique to
estimate the following system of equations:
(4)
ln (Market value of equity)i ' "0 % "1 ln (Expected profit)i % "2 ln (Profit risk)i % ,i
ln (Expected profit)i ' $0 % $Nxi % >i
ln (Profit risk)i ' (0 % (Nxi % .i .
The R
2 on the market-value-of-equity equation in the system indicates the degree to which our measures
of expected profit and risk from the production model explain variations in the market value of equity. 
In  addition, we  investigate the relationship between the market value of assets and geographic
diversity, estimating equation (1) using the market value of assets as the performance measure.
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We also compute two inefficiency measures using market values of equity and of assets (see
Hughes, Lang, Moon, and Pagano, 1998), and estimate equation (1) using these inefficiency measures as
measures of performance.  These two inefficiency measures gauge the ability of the bank to create18
12Since goodwill is a component of market value, the book value of assets is adjusted to remove
goodwill. See Demsetz and Strahan (1995).
franchise value from efficient practices and market opportunities, including the exercise of market power
(see footnote 11).  And, as discussed above, they alleviate a drawback of our production-based measure
of inefficiency, as they are able to account for whether the BHC’s choice of risk is optimal.
Given the book value of a bank’s assets adjusted to remove goodwill, we estimate the following
frontiers using stochastic frontier estimation techniques:
(5)
Market Value of Equityi ' M0 % M1Adjusted Book Value of Equityi





Market Value of Assetsi ' Q0 % Q1Adjusted Book Value of Assetsi




where the adjusted book value of equity is the book value of equity minus goodwill and the adjusted





















i  positive and
half normally distributed.
12  The market-value equity inefficiency of a BHC is then measured by the




i.  It is interpreted as the dollar amount by which the BHC could increase
the market value of its equity if it were as well positioned in the marketplace and as efficient as the best-
practice BHCs that define the frontier.  Similarly, the market-value asset inefficiency of a BHC is




i, and represents the amount by which the BHC could
increase the market value of its assets if it were as well positioned in the marketplace and as efficient as
the best-practice BHCs.  When there are no agency problems that result in risk shifting and the
expropriation of value from debtholders, maximizing the value of equity is equivalent to maximizing the
value of assets.  Hence, the two measures of market-value efficiency should yield qualitatively similar19
13The data on the number of branches and deposits per branch are from the FDIC’s Summary of
Deposit reports.
14An alternative measure using asset shares yields essentially the same values.  The correlation
between the two measures is 0.992.
results.  However, when there are such agency problems, measuring efficiency using the asset-based
measure will capture the inefficiency due to risk shifting.
It is important to note that these market-value measures of inefficiency are conditioned on the
BHC’s size while profit inefficiency, based on the production model, is not.  That is, the market-based
measures do not account for inefficiency due to a poor choice of size while the production-based
measure does.  But the production-based measure does not account for a nonoptimal risk choice by the
BHC, while the market-value inefficiency measures do.
5.  Measures of BHC Structure and Consolidation
From one-bank holding companies operating in a single state with limited branch networks to
huge multibank holding companies operating in many states with extensive branch networks, a BHC’s
structure reflects its history of consolidation activities.  This structure is reflected in a BHC’s asset size
along with various other measures of its geographical extension and diversity.
  Consolidation affects the extensiveness of a BHC’s branch network, which we measure by the
number of branches and the number of states in which the BHC operates and by the degree to which
assets and deposits are dispersed over the network.
13  We measure the degree of a BHC’s deposit
dispersion by the inverse of the sum (over the states in which it operates) of the squared proportion of its






share of the BHC’s deposits in state I.  Hence, this ratio equals one when the BHC’s operations are
located in one state and exceeds one to the degree that deposits are spread over more than one state, and
given the number of states, to the degree that deposits are more equally dispersed over these states.
14  In
our regressions we also include a dummy variable OBHC equal to one if the BHC is a one-bank holding20
15A BHC is said to have acquired assets, on net, if the volume of assets it acquired over 1992-94
exceeded the volume of assets it sold.  Of the 249 BHCs in the full sample that, on net, did not acquire
assets over the 1992-94 period, only 23 were net sellers of assets.
company and equal to zero otherwise to allow for differences across holding company type.
Two BHCs with the same level of deposit dispersion may nevertheless benefit quite differently
from geographic diversity when the macroeconomic environments in which they operate differ.  When
fluctuations in macroeconomic activity in the various states in which a BHC operates are not perfectly
correlated, a BHC’s geographic diversity can reduce its exposure to systematic risk.  Hence, to control
for these differences, we also characterize geographic diversity by a measure of macroeconomic
diversification.  To obtain this measure, we first compute a variance-covariance matrix for state
unemployment rates over 1985-94.  Then for each BHC, we compute the inverse of the standard
deviation of its weighted-average unemployment rate in the states in which it operated in 1994, using its
deposit shares in its states as the weights.  That is, if V is the matrix of variances and covariances in state
unemployment rates over 1985-94 and s is a vector of a BHC’s deposit shares in each state, the BHC’s
macroeconomic diversity = 1/[sNVs]
½.  
Finally, we include the BHC’s 1994 asset level and asset growth rate between 1993 to 1994 to
separate the effect of size from that of change in size.
Table 1, column 1, shows the mean and median values of our BHC performance measures and
geographic diversification measures (recall that the market value measures are available only for the 190
BHCs in our sample that are publicly traded).
Geographic diversification is a natural byproduct of industry consolidation and, prior to the
Riegle-Neal legislation, mergers and acquisitions were the main method BHCs had to achieve
geographic diversification.  The data shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 confirm this.  There we show
the means and medians of our geographic diversification variables (and of our BHC performance
measures) for two subsamples: BHCs that, on net, acquired assets over the period 1992-94, and all other
BHCs.
15  As the difference in mean and median tests show, net asset acquirers are more often multibank21
16When we say nonacquirers, we mean the BHCs did not acquire, on net, assets in the 1992-94
period.  They could have acquired assets earlier.
17The results discussed below are quite similar to those obtained when we divide the sample into
those BHCs that, on net, acquired institutions in 1992-94 and those that did not.
holding companies; they operate in 2-3 states on average as opposed to 1-2 states; they have significantly
more branches; and their levels of deposit dispersion and macroeconomic diversity are also higher than
for nonacquirers.
16,17  (The differences in performance measures between acquirers and nonacquirers
suggest that they are operating at different points on the return-risk frontier, with acquirers having higher
expected profits and higher profit risk.)
The correlations shown in Table 2 provide further confirmation that our measures of BHC
structure and geographic diversification are indicators of acquisition behavior.  In all cases the volume of
net assets acquired and net institutions acquired are positively correlated to our measures of geographic
diversification, and except for the correlation between macroeconomic diversity and net assets acquired
or total assets, these correlations are highly significant.
Consolidation can affect BHC structure and performance in various ways.  Our estimated
equations allow us to consider, in turn, the effects on performance and market value of the number of
branches, the number of states, the index of deposit dispersion, and the index of macroeconomic
diversification, controlling for size and change in size.  Defining the branch network of a BHC by the
number of its branches and states and by its index of deposit dispersion, we consider how a proportionate
expansion in its branch network affects its performance, controlling for size, change in size, and
macroeconomic diversification.  Then, we consider how a more expansive branch network that entails
better macroeconomic diversification affects performance by proportionately varying both the size of the
network and the index of macroeconomic diversification.
Next, we investigate the effect of geography when asset size is allowed to vary.  Holding the
number of states constant to establish a benchmark, we consider the effects of a proportionate variation
in total assets and branches.  This type of expansion represents a within-state consolidation strategy that22
18We also estimated the expected profit, profit risk, profit inefficiency, and insolvency risk
regressions on the subsample of 190 publicly traded BHCs.  The results are similar to the ones reported
in the paper for the full 441 BHC sample.
does not diversify state-specific macroeconomic risk.  To isolate the effect of interstate expansion, we
then add the number of states and the index of deposit dispersion to the list of variables that vary
proportionately.  This expansion simulates a consolidation strategy that, for example, involves moving
into neighboring states whose macroeconomic conditions are similar to the home state, so that the index
of macroeconomic diversification is not affected.  Then, to identify the contribution of macroeconomic
diversification, we allow it to vary, too.  This expansion represents a consolidation strategy that both
enlarges the bank and geographically diversifies it.
Finally, we examine whether our results differ for BHCs that were net asset acquirers in 1992-94
and those that were not by estimating equation (1) and the system of equations (4) allowing all the
coefficients to vary for these two groups of BHCs.  Wald tests are used to determine whether the
restricted model, which does not allow for any difference across the groups, can be rejected in favor of
the unrestricted model.  Differences in the results on the effects of geographic diversification on
performance across the two groups are examined in cases where the restricted model is rejected.
6.  Empirical Results
Our first set of results is reported in Table 3.  The effects of consolidation on expected profit,
profit risk (the standard error of expected profit), the degree of profit inefficiency, and insolvency risk
(the inverse z-score) are reported for the entire sample of 441 BHCs, while its effects on the market
value of equity and on market-value inefficiency are computed for the subset of 190 BHCs that are
publicly traded.
18  For the exogenous variables that are in logs, the coefficients are elasticity estimates. 
Note that our production-model-based performance measures, expected profit and profit risk, do appear
to be priced in capital markets, since the R
2 for the market-value-of-equity equation is 0.96.  In other23
19Note that this is the R
2 for the single equation of market value of equity regressed on expected
profit and profit risk; it does not merely reflect the relationship between the market value of equity and
the book value of equity in the reduced form of the model.
Using the same sample of BHCs that we use, Hughes and Moon (1997) also found that measures
of expected profit and risk explain 96 percent of the variation in the market value of equity.
words, our performance measures explain 96 percent of the variation in equity value.
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6.1.  Asset size and asset growth.  Turning first to the effects of asset size and growth, we find
that a higher growth rate is associated with reduced profit risk, with reduced risk of insolvency, and with
reduced profit inefficiency.  Although a higher growth rate of assets is associated with a lower market
value of equity, this relationship may simply signify that more highly levered BHCs grow more rapidly. 
A better indication of the effect of growth on market value can be obtained from its effect on market-
value inefficiency.  The coefficients in the last two columns of Table 3 show that, in fact, the growth rate
has no statistically significant effect on either asset-based or equity-based market-value inefficiency.
Asset size, on the other hand, is positively related to expected profit and profit risk, with its
coefficient significantly less than one in the profit regression and significantly greater than one in the risk
regression.  Hence, a proportionate expansion in asset size is associated with a less-than-proportionate
increase in expected profit and a more-than-proportionate increase in risk.  This means that an increase in
asset size implies a more-than-proportionate increase in profit inefficiency, as shown in the fourth
column.  And although they are not statistically significant, the positive signs for the effect of asset size
on the two market-value measures of inefficiency are consistent with this result.  Finally, a proportionate
expansion in assets leads to a less-than-proportionate expansion in the market value of equity&a result
that may imply that there are scale economies in the use of equity capital (see Hughes and Mester, 1998)
6.2.  One-bank holding companies.  In addition to controlling for asset size and its growth rate,
we include a dummy variable that equals one when the BHC is a one-bank holding company (OBHC). 
This control variable is not significantly related to expected profit, profit risk, the risk of insolvency, nor
to any of the inefficiency measures.  However, it is significantly associated with a lower market value of
assets.24
6.3.  Branch network components.  The effects on performance of the components of a BHC’s
branch network vary across performance measure.  When we control for asset size, branches, and deposit
dispersion, the number of states in which a BHC operates is positively related to expected profit and both
profit risk and insolvency risk.  Although the number of states is insignificantly positively related to
profit inefficiency, its relationship to both market-value measures of inefficiency is positive and
significant.  When we control for size, the number of states is negatively related to the market values of
equity and assets, significantly so for assets.  Hence, BHCs that have more extensive interstate operations
appear to be taking on more risk in exchange for higher expected profit.  When we control for size, the
market-value measures of inefficiency indicate that these BHCs are less efficient than those that operate
in fewer states.  This inefficiency result might be reflecting the fact that since we are controlling for size
(as well as the number of branches and deposit dispersion), banks that operate in many states have a
smaller average scale of operation in any state than banks that operate in fewer states.
When we hold constant the number of states, deposit dispersion, and asset size, an increase in the
number of branches is associated with higher expected profit, lower profit risk and insolvency risk, and
lower profit inefficiency.  It is also negatively related to both measures of market-value inefficiency, but
not significantly so.   Additionally, it is positively related to both the market value of equity and of
assets.  These benefits of an expansion in the number of branches, holding assets and the number of
states constant, may partly result from better within-state geographic diversity and a potential for greater
growth in size afforded by more branches.  This positive relationship between branches and performance
is consistent with the fact that, while consolidation has resulted in fewer banks, it has also led to an
increase in bank branches.  For example, between year-end 1980 and year-end 1996, the number of
insured commercial banks fell by 34%, but the number of branches rose by 49% (based on FDIC data).
When we hold the numbers of branches and states as well as asset size constant, an increase in
deposit dispersion is associated with lower insolvency risk and, hence, probably lower profit risk;
however, the negative coefficient associated with profit risk is insignificant.  Both market-based25
measures of inefficiency indicate that deposit dispersion is associated with lower inefficiency. 
When we hold asset size and growth as well as the branch network constant, an increase in the
index of macroeconomic diversification is negatively related to both profit risk and insolvency risk.  In
turn, it is associated with lower profit inefficiency and higher market value of assets; it is also positively
related to the market value of equity, but not significantly so.  Although the coefficients are not
statistically significant, the negative signs of the market-based measures of inefficiency are consistent
with the production-based measure.  
These two results for deposit dispersion and for macroeconomic diversification indicate that,
controlling for size and branch network, better geographic diversity is related to greater efficiency and
possibly higher asset value.
6.4.  Branch network extensiveness and macroeconomic diversity.  We turn next to the
evidence on how the extensiveness of the branch network affects performance.   We control for asset
size, growth, and macroeconomic diversity to consider a proportionate expansion in the number of
branches and states and in the index of deposit dispersion.  This increase in the extensiveness of the
branch network, holding size constant, is associated with increased expected profit, reduced risk of
insolvency, and reduced profit inefficiency.  The reductions in both the asset-based and equity-based
measures of market-value inefficiency provide evidence that the gains in profit efficiency measured by
the production model are priced by capital markets.  Hence, at any given asset size, BHCs that are more
geographically extensive achieve significantly better financial performance and lower insolvency risk
than those that are more geographically restricted.
When we vary not just the extensiveness of the branch network but also the index of
macroeconomic diversification, we find that, controlling for asset size and growth, a more extensive
network that also entails better macroeconomic diversification is significantly related to lower profit risk
and insolvency risk.  The effect on expected profit is positive but statistically insignificant.  As these
results would imply, profit inefficiency measured by the production model is lower, and the two market-26
based measures confirm that this improvement in efficiency is priced by capital markets.  Thus, these
benefits of geographic expansion and diversification give banks an important economic incentive to
consolidate, especially across state lines.
6.5.  Scale effects.  Since a larger volume of assets is thought to facilitate diversification in
general and  geographic diversity in particular, we turn to the evidence on how the scale of geographic
expansiveness affects performance.  To gauge the effects of a within-state consolidation strategy, we
hold the number of states constant as well as the indices of deposit dispersion and macroeconomic
diversification and find that a proportionate increase in asset size and branches alone is associated with a
more-than-proportionate increase in expected profit and a less-than-proportionate increase in profit risk. 
These two effects translate into a reduction in the risk of insolvency and a relative reduction in profit
inefficiency, since profit inefficiency increases less than proportionately.  Although the signs of the
effects on the two market-value measures of inefficiency are consistent with this relative reduction in
inefficiency, they are not statistically significant.  Thus, within-state expansion confers clear benefits, in
terms of reduced insolvency risk, even though there is only weak evidence of its benefits for market
value.
To consider an interstate consolidation strategy that does no affect macroeconomic
diversification, we vary the number of states and the index of deposit dispersion as well as asset size and
branches, holding the index of macroeconomic diversification constant, and we find that expected profit,
profit risk, and profit inefficiency all increase proportionately, since their elasticities are not significantly
different from one.  The effect on the risk of insolvency is not significantly different from zero.  Both the
market value of equity and the market value of assets increase proportionately.  In addition, given the
book value of equity and assets, the distance from the two respective market-value frontiers, that is,
market-value inefficiency, decreases.  Hence, an expansion in asset size that involves interstate
branching improves market-value efficiency even though it does not significantly reduce insolvency risk.
To consider an interstate consolidation strategy that improves macroeconomic diversification,27
20Recall that our groups of BHCs are those that, on net, acquired assets in 1992-94 and those that,
on net, did not.  The geographic diversity measures&number of states, deposit dispersion, and
macroeconomic diversity&would show variation across BHCs in the second group to the extent they
acquired assets, i.e., expanded into more than one state, prior to 1992.
21The full set of regression coefficients are available from the authors.
we lastly consider a proportionate expansion in asset size, numbers of states and branches, deposit
dispersion, and macroeconomic diversification.  Our results show that profit elasticity is again not
significantly different from one, so expected profit increases equi-proportionately.  The elasticity of
profit risk is less than one, but not significantly so.  However, the elasticity of profit inefficiency is
significantly less than one, so that relative inefficiency improves.  This improvement is reflected in the
reduced values of the two measures of market-value inefficiency.  Moreover, the risk of insolvency is
also diminished.   Hence, it appears that larger BHCs, whose more extensive branch networks have
afforded them better macroeconomic diversification, achieve greater safety and improved efficiency,
which is priced by capital markets.
6.6.  Results for recent net asset acquirers and other BHCs.  It is possible that the effects of
geographic diversification on performance would differ for BHCs that had recently been more aggressive
at acquiring assets than for other BHCs.
20  Our results suggest that this does not, in general, appear to be
the case.  The Wald test statistics reported in Table 4 indicate that the restricted models (whose results
were presented in Table 3), which do not allow the coefficient estimates to vary between BHCs that were
net asset acquirers and those that were not, can be rejected only in the case of profit risk and insolvency
risk.  For these two cases, Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates that significantly differ between net
asset acquirers and nonacquirers.
21  As can be seen, while certain effects statistically differ between the
two groups, the differences are fairly small.  One consistent finding is that greater geographic
diversification appears to be related to lower insolvency risk for both groups, but the effect is larger for
the nonacquirers.  This suggests that it may take some time for the full effects of diversification to be
felt.  It might also indicate that there are diminishing returns, in terms of reduced insolvency risk, of
greater geographic diversification, since our measures of geographic diversification are generally larger28
22We obtained similar results when instead of allowing the coefficients in the model to differ
according to whether the BHC was a net asset acquirer or not, we allowed them to differ in a continuous
way with the level of net assets acquired, i.e., when we included interaction terms between the
exogenous variables in the model and the level of net assets acquired.
for the acquirers than for the nonacquirers.
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7.  Conclusions and Policy Implications
In his study, Rhoades (1996) concluded that increased opportunities for geographic expansion
made possible by changes in state laws on branching, coupled with a more favorable antitrust climate,
drove the wave of bank mergers during the period 1980-94.  But what drove banks to take advantage of
their new opportunities to expand and consolidate?  Using a variety of  measures of financial
performance and bank safety, we have found strong evidence that consolidation provides significant
gains to BHCs in terms of improved financial performance and safety&gains that are priced by capital
markets.
Geographic diversity plays a crucial role in securing these gains.  We contrast: (1) a within-state
consolidation strategy&a proportionate expansion of assets and branches, (2) an interstate consolidation
strategy that does not diversify state-specific macroeconomic risk&a proportionate expansion of assets
and branches plus states and the index of deposit dispersion, and (3) an interstate consolidation strategy
that diversifies state-specific macroeconomic risk&a proportionate expansion of assets, branches, states,
the index of deposit dispersion, plus the index of macroeconomic diversification.  The clearest gains
come from expansion across state lines, especially when this interstate expansion diversifies
macroeconomic risk.
Consolidation that enhances geographic diversity also improves bank safety measured by the risk
of insolvency.  The contrast between proportionate increases in (1) branches, states, and deposit
dispersion and (2) branches, states, deposit dispersion, plus assets suggests that enhanced geographic
diversity reduces the risk of insolvency while increased size tends to increase this risk, while the contrast29
between proportional increases in (1) branches, states, deposit dispersion, and macroeconomic
diversification and (2) branches, states, deposit dispersion, macroeconomic diversification, plus assets
indicates that consolidation that enhances macroeconomic diversification can significantly offset the
tendency of larger banks to take more insolvency risk.  
In addition to uncovering evidence that bank consolidation in the United States has improved
banks’ financial performance and has enhanced the safety of the payments system, our investigation has
shown the importance of accounting for risk and, in particular, recognizing its endogeneity when one is 
measuring bank efficiency.30
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Table 1.  Means and Medians of the Data
Variable Full Sample Subsample with Net
Assets Acquired > 0
Subsample with Net
Assets Acquired # 0
































































$     223,871,000
$       18,043,000
$    347,808,000*
$      56,618,000
$   128,306,000*
$     11,092,000
Profit Risk mean
median
$         6,621,000
$            339,000
$        7,936,000
$           866,000**
$       5,607,000











$       69,321,000
$         3,357,000
$       81,782,000
$         8,430,000**
$     59,711,000
$       2,114,000**
Net Assets Acquired mean
median
$     929,755,000
$                       0
$ 2,177,288,000**
$    273,576,000**
!$    32,198,000**

















$     252,552,000
$ 1,328,729,000
$    463,970,000**
$   823,897,000















$     401,441,000
$     347,512,000
$     393,280,000
$     351,583,000
$   416,082,000





$     423,670,000
$     363,915,000
$     413,753,000
$     364,443,000
$   441,463,000
$   363,792,000
+ Assets reflect book value of assets from the BHC Y-9 reports.
* Significantly different from other subsample’s value at the 5 percent or better level.
** Significantly different from other subsample’s value at the 1 percent or better level.34













No. of States 0.634
(0.0001)
















































+Pearson correlation coefficients, with p-values of the tests for zero correlation in parentheses.35
Table 3.  Coefficient Estimates























































































































































2 0.9905 0.9626 0.2520 0.8829 0.9597 0.9997 0.2140 0.2254 


















Prop. increase in branches, states,

































Prop. increase in assets, branches,

















Prop. increase in assets, branches,

















+These estimates are obtained from estimating system (16) in the text, where  x is the vector of independent variables shown in the chart.  Assets reflect book value of assets in the Compustat data; in all other regressions assets
reflect Call Report values.
,When the ln(market value of assets/book value of assets) is used as the dependent variable, the coefficient on the  ln(market value of assets) becomes !0.0056, with t-statistic !1.67764; the R
2 becomes 0.1133.
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, t-test. **Significantly different from zero at the 5% level, t-test. ***Significantly different from zero at the 1% level, t-test.36 36
+Significantly different from one at the 10% level, t-test. ++Significantly different from one at the 5% level, t-test. +++Significantly different from one at the 1% level, t-test.37
Table 4. Wald Tests of Restricted Versus Unrestricted Models
Restricted models restrict the regression coefficients for BHCs that were net asset acquirers over 1992-94
to be equal to the regression coefficients for BHCs that were not net asset acquirers over 1992-94.
There are 8 restrictions in each model.  The Wald test statistic is distributed P



















































Table 5.  Coefficient Estimates That Significantly Differ between Net Asset Acquirers and Others+














































































2 0.9645 0.9626 0.2872       0.2520














Prop. increase in branches, states,

















Prop. increase in assets, branches,













Prop. increase in assets, branches,













+Unrestricted model coefficients are obtained by estimating system (16) in the text, where  x is the vector of independent variables shown in the table, allowing the coefficients
to differ between BHCs that were net asset acquirers and all other BHCs.  The coefficients shown for the unrestricted model are those that significantly differ for the two types
of BHCs at the 10 percent level or better.
*Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, t-test.   **Significantly different from zero at the 5% level, t-test.   ***Significantly different from zero at the 1% level, t-
test.
+Significantly different from one at the 10% level, t-test.   ++Significantly different from one at the 5% level, t-test.   +++Significantly different from one at the 1% level, t-
test.